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CRIMINAL LAW-RESISTING ARREST-UNLAWFUL ARREST-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that resistance to an arrest
found to be unlawful cannot result in a conviction for resisting
arrest but can result in a conviction for aggravated assault.
Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995).
In Commonwealth v. Biagini and In re Barry W.,2 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court rendered inconsistent decisions
dealing with the issue of whether a person can be convicted of
resisting arrest when the underlying arrest is unlawful.' To
resolve this issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
allocatur and consolidated the appeals."
While investigating a loud voice heard while on patrol, Officer
Darryl Snyder, Jr. ("Snyder") of the North Belle Vernon Borough
Police Department began questioning Bruce Biagini ("Biagini")
in the rear yard of Biagini's home.' Biagini directed Snyder to
two individuals across the alley who told Snyder that Biagini
had been screaming at them and had thrown an object at
them.' When Snyder returned to Biagini's house, Biagini
refused to go to the patrol car and answer questions.7 Snyder
then attempted to arrest Biagini for public intoxication and
disorderly conduct, but Biagini refused to comply.8 While
1. 627 A.2d 199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (mem.), aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 655
A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995).
2. 621 A.2d 669 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), affd sub noma. Commonwealth v.
Biagini, 655 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995).
3. Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. 1995).
4. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 493. Allocatur is a term used to denote that a writ
or order is allowed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 494. The complete names of the officers and police
department are from Biagini's Brief. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Biagini (No. 6
W.D. Appeal Docket 1994). Snyder drove down the alley to Biagini's yard after see-
ing Biagini stagger out of and then back into the alley. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 494.
6. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 494.
7. Id. Biagini went into his house despite being asked to remain outside. Id.
When Snyder knocked on Biagini's door, Biagini screamed: 'Who the [expletive] is
tearing down my door?" Id. (alteration in original). After Snyder responded, Biagini
ordered the officer to leave the porch. Id. However, Biagini apparently did come onto
the porch. See id.
8. Id. Biagini shook free of the officer's grip and went back into his house.
Id.
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attempting to physically apprehend Biagini, Snyder was
punched in the mouth.' With the help of additional officers,
Biagini was subdued and subsequently arrested.' o
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed suit against Biagini
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.' In a
non-jury trial, Biagini was convicted of aggravated assault,
resisting arrest, and other offenses relating to the reason for the
arrest and to items subsequently discovered. 2 Biagini filed
post-trial motions for dismissal of all charges, contending that
the arrest was illegal. 3 The trial court denied the motions in
an opinion that found the arrest to be lawful, 4 and Biagini
appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania."
In a memorandum opinion, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that Biagini's arrest was invalid because it
was made without probable cause. 7  The superior court
determined that Biagini did not create a public disturbance and
that Snyder had no probable cause to arrest Biagini for
disorderly conduct. 8 The court also found no probable cause to
arrest Biagini for public drunkenness because he was not in a
public place." Thus, the court overturned the convictions
directly relating to the arrest." Nonetheless, in finding that
Biagini resisted an officer in the performance of duty, the
superior court affirmed the convictions for resisting arrest and
aggravated assault.2 '
In responding to an anonymous tip that reported a male
9. Id. Although it is not clear from the opinion, the Commonwealth's brief
indicates that Biagini pushed Snyder and fled into the house, and Snyder followed
him. Brief for Appellee at 3, 6, Biagini (No. 6 W.D. Appeal Docket 1994).
10. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 494. A search of Biagini's person revealed a set of
"brass knuckles" and a small amount of marijuana. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The other convictions were for public drunkenness, disorderly conduct,
prohibited offensive weapons, and possession of marijuana. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Biagini, 627 A.2d at 199.
16. Id.
17. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 495. "Probable cause justifying officer's arrest without
warrant has been defined as situation where officer has more evidence favoring sus-
picion that person is guilty of crime than evidence against such suspicion, but there
is some room for doubt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990).
18. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 494-95. The court noted that there was no evidence
of a crowd or uninvolved parties, and that vulgar language directed at a police offi-
cer in one's own residence is not disorderly conduct. Id. at 495.
19. Id. at 495.
20. Id. at 500. The convictions for public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, pro-
hibited offensive weapons, and possession of marijuana were dismissed. Id.
21. Id. at 495, 500.
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selling narcotics, Officer David Ashby ("Ashby") of the
Philadelphia Police Department saw Barry W. and another male
on a corner at the reported location.2 The males were standing
under a shelter because of a driving rain but fled when Ashby
exited his car.23 Pursuing on foot, Ashby witnessed Barry W.
throw an unidentified object to the other male.24 After Ashby
was joined in the chase by Officer Delores Boran ("Boran"), a
struggle ensued as both officers attempted to subdue Barry
W.2 During the struggle, Barry W. struck Boran and later
pushed her. 6 Boran fell against a truck, cutting her hand on a
broken mirror.27
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
adjudicated Barry W. delinquent based on the charges of
resisting arrest and aggravated assault.' Barry W. appealed to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.' The superior court
concluded that the arrest was illegal because it lacked not only
probable cause, but also the reasonable suspicion necessary for a
"Terry stop.' 3° Based on this finding, the superior court vacated
the resisting arrest conviction, but affirmed the adjudication of
delinquency based on the offense of aggravated assault.3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur to
resolve the inconsistent holdings in Biagini and Barry W. with
respect to the charge of resisting arrest.32 The first issue before
22. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 671 (quoting the trial court transcript). The particu-
lar police department involved is named in Appellant Barry W.'s Brief. See Brief for
Appellant at 5, Biagini (No. 3 E.D. Appeal Docket 1994). Ashby was in uniform and
in a marked police car. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 671.
23. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 672.
24. Id. Ashby thought the thrown object was a quantity of drugs but no other
officer saw this and no drugs were found after the males were apprehended. Biagini,
655 A.2d at 495.
25. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 671.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 670.
29. Id. The appeal was originally heard by a panel of the superior court but
the panel's decision was reaffirmed en banc with two judges dissenting in part. Id.
30. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 674-75. The superior court held that the anonymous
tip which failed to adequately describe the suspect selling drugs, the unrecovered
object allegedly thrown by Barry W., and the flight of Barry W. all failed to satisfy
not only the probable cause requirement for a warrantless arrest but also the rea-
sonable suspicion requirement of a Terry stop. Id. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (holding that police may make a temporary investigatory stop without proba-
ble cause if they have reasonable suspicion of a crime).
31. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 680.
32. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 493. Justice Cappy authored the majority opinion. Id.
Justice Zappala concurred in the result. Id. at 500 (Zappala, J., concurring). Justice
Papadakos fied a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Castille. Id.
(Papadakos, J., dissenting).
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether one can be
convicted for resisting arrest when the underlying arrest is
unlawful." The supreme court also decided the issue of
whether one can be convicted of aggravated assault when one
physically resists an unlawful arrest.'
Relying on the well-established standard of review stated in
Commonwealth v. Burton,5 the supreme court first considered
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge of
resisting arrest.36 The court determined that the language of
section 5104 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code ("section 5104")
makes it clear that a necessary element for the crime of
resisting arrest is the lawfulness of the underlying arrest.37
Adopting the reasoning in Commonwealth v. Stortecky,38 the
supreme court noted that, for an arrest to be lawful, the
arresting officer must act with authority and probable cause,
which is a question of law for a court."6 Because the supreme
court accepted the legal conclusions of the superior court that
each arrest was made without probable cause, the supreme court
33. Id. at 496. Resisting arrest is defined in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as
follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any
other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public
servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial
force to overcome the resistance.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (1990).
34. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 497. The crime of aggravated assault is defined as
follows:
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury
to a police officer, firefighter or county adult probation or parole officer,
county juvenile probation or parole officer or an agent of the Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole in the performance of duty;
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(3) (1990).
35. 301 A.2d 599 (Pa. 1973). The standard of review for a claim of insufficien-
cy of the evidence is given in Burton:
As we have repeatedly said the test in determining if the evidence is suffi-
cient to sustain a criminal conviction is, whether accepting as true all of the
evidence of the Commonwealth, and all reasonable inferences arising there-
from, upon which the jury could properly have reached its verdict, was it suf-
ficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was
guilty of the crime of which he stands convicted.
Burton, 301 A.2d at 600.
36. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 496-97.
37. Id. at 497.. The court emphasized the words "lawful arrest" in this defini-
tion in explaining why the arrest must be lawful. Id.
38. 352 A.2d 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
39. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 497. See Stortecky, 352 A.2d at 491-92 (holding that
the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of a lawful
arrest and in deciding that there was probable cause for an arrest).
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concluded that each arrest was unlawful.4 Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the superior court's affirmation of the
conviction of Biagini of resisting arrest and affirmed the
superior court's order reversing the conviction of Barry W. of
resisting arrest.4'
In considering the charges of aggravated assault, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court next examined the defendants'
argument that physical resistance to the officers' attempted
apprehensions was justified because the arrests were
unlawful.42  The defendants argued that the charges of
aggravated assault could not be based on such resistance.'
Relying on Commonwealth v. French," the defendants also
contended that all charges resulting from their resistance to the
unlawful arrests must be dropped because the nature and extent
of the force used by the officers justified resistance.'
In rejecting this argument, the supreme court stated that
even if an arrest is unlawful, physical resistance is never
justified."s The court opined that in a civilized society, whether
probable cause exists for an arrest is a legal determination that
cannot be made on a street corner.47 The court noted that
physical resistance to arrest is also prohibited by section 505 of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code ("section 505").'
40. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 497. In the appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, the Commonwealth in Biagini did not argue that the arrest was lawful. See
Brief for Appellee at 4, Biagini (No. 6 W.D. Appeal Docket 1994). The Common-
wealth in Barry W. argued that the investigatory stop was valid. See Brief for Ap-
pellant at 8-15, Biagini (No. 3 E.D. Appeal Docket 1994). However, the supreme
court only mentioned this issue in its summary of the superior court's decision,
when it stated that the superior court found that there was not reasonable suspicion
for a Terry stop. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 496. In its own discussion, the supreme court
stated only that "[u]pon review of the well-reasoned opinions of the Superior Court
in both cases, we accept the legal conclusion that no probable cause existed for ei-
ther arrest." Id. at 497.
41. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 497.
42. Id. at 496.
43. Id.
44. 611 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1992). In French, the defendant hit a police officer who
was in the process of arresting the defendant's boyfriend and another male. French,
611 A.2d at 176. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that justification is a
defense only if the defendant reasonably believed that force was immediately neces-
sary to protect her boyfriend from death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 179.
45. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 499. Biagini claimed that Snyder used excessive force.
Id. Barry W. argued in the alternative that: (1) he offered very little resistance; and
(2) his resistance stemmed from his fear of Boran's use of force. Id. Barry W.
maintained that he did not present facts to support this second argument at trial
because French had not yet been published. id.
46. Id. at 497.
47. Id.
48. Id. Section 505(b) states:
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Furthermore, the supreme court noted two errors in the
defendants' argument. 9 First, the court explained that a lawful
arrest is no longer an element of the crime of aggravated
assault, and that the amended section 2702 only requires that
the assault occur when the officer is in the performance of
duty.50 Therefore, because the supreme court decided that the
Commonwealth showed that both defendants intentionally
caused bodily injury to police officers in the performance of their
duties, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support convictions of aggravated assault."'
The supreme court explained that the defendants also erred in
their interpretation of the court's decision in French."
Distinguishing French from Biagini, the supreme court noted
that the reference to unlawful police conduct in French was to
the unlawful use of excessive force and not to the unlawfulness
of an arrest itself.5" Therefore, the court stated that the focus in
Use of force in self protection.
(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.
(1) The use of force is not justifiable under this section:
(i) to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a
peace officer, although the arrest. is unlawful ....
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i).
49. Biagini, 655 A-2d at 498.
50. Id. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(3) (1990). The court referred to the
substitution of the phrase "in the performance of duty" for the previous phrase
"making or attempting to make a lawful arrest," in a 1986 amendment, as evidence
of legislative intent to broaden the statute to protect officers making arrests that are
later determined to be without probable cause. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 498.
51. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 498. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(3). The court
stated that the element requiring the officers to be in the "performance of duty" was
satisfied because Snyder was investigating a neighborhood disturbance and Boran
was responding to a radio call and aiding another officer. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 498.
The court stated that the other elements of the crime were satisfied because there
was sufficient evidence to show that Biagini intentionally injured Snyder and Barry
W. intentionally pushed Boran. Id.
52. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 499.
53. Id. Whether an officer's use of force is unlawful is determined by section
508 of the Crimes Code:
Use of force in law enforcement.
(a) Peace officer's use of force in making arrest.
(1) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed
to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful
arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is
justified in the use of any force which he believes to be necessary to
effect the arrest and of any force which he believes to be necessary to
defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.
However, he is justified in using deadly force only when he believes
that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to
himself or such other person, or when he believes both that:
(i) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being de-
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French was on the right of self-defense.'
In explaining the French decision, the supreme court strongly
reiterated that there is no right to resist arrest, and that the
lawfulness of an arrest must be determined in a court of law.5
Moreover, the supreme court noted that French limited the right
of self-defense to those situations where an officer unlawfully
uses force that would result in death or serious bodily harm."6
Therefore, because the court found that the officers' use of force
in both Biagini and Barry W. was not excessive, 7 it affirmed
both convictions of aggravated assault."8
In Biagini's appeal, the supreme court reversed only the part
of the order of the superior court affirming the conviction of
resisting arrest. 9 Additionally, the supreme court vacated the
judgment of sentence, and remanded to the trial court for
sentencing." As to the appeal of Barry W., the supreme court
affirmed the order of the superior court. 1
Justice Papadakos wrote a dissenting opinion that disagreed
with the court's reversal of Biagini's conviction of resisting
arrest.6 2 Justice Papadakos noted that section 5104, which
defines the offense of resisting arrest, deals not only with the
prevention of an officer making a lawful arrest, but also with
the prevention of an officer's discharge of any other duty.'
feated by resistance or escape; and
(ii) the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forc-
ible felony or is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly
weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life
or inflict serious bodily injury unless arrested without delay.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 508(a)(1) (1990).
54. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 499.
55. Id.
56. Id. The French court based this conclusion on the Official Comment to
§ 505(b)(1Xi) in rejecting the Commonwealth's argument that the arrestee may never
use force against the arresting officer. French, 611 A.2d at 178.
57. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 500. In Biagini, the supreme court, referencing Com-
monwealth v. Medley, 612 A.2d 430 (Pa. 1992), found that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in affirming the trial court's determi-
nation that the force was not excessive, even though Biagini complained that a stun
gun was used during the struggle. Id. In Barry W., the supreme court held that,
because the record indicated that Barry W. said his resistance was so slight as to
not be convicted of aggravated assault if Boran's hand had not been cut, Barry W.
did not believe the force was excessive and was not acting in self-defense. Id. There-
fore, the supreme court denied Barry W.'s request that his case be remanded so that





62. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 501 (Papadakos, J., dissenting).
63. Id. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104.
Duquesne Law Review
According to Justice Papadakos, Biagini interfered with Snyder's
investigation of a public disturbance and should have been
convicted of resisting arrest." Justice Papadakos would,
therefore, have affirmed the superior court in both cases. 5
There existed a right to resist an unlawful arrest at both
English and American common law.6" An unlawful arrest was
viewed as a provocation that would excuse assault entirely and,
in the case of homicide, reduce the degree of the crime from
murder to manslaughter." This common law right was not
changed by statute in Pennsylvania until 1973 with the
enactment of section 505(b)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code.68
In Commonwealth v. Doe, 9  the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania followed the common law approach in reviewing a
resisting arrest issue.7" In Doe, the defendant refused to submit
to questioning and tried to walk away after a constable would
not let him drive an automobile containing evidence of illegal
gambling activity."1 The constable stepped in front of the
defendant to ask more questions, and the defendant pushed the
constable with only enough force to continue on his way.72
After deciding that the officer's detention of the defendant was
illegal, the court faced the issue of whether the defendant could
be convicted of assault and battery for pushing the officer
aside.73 Following the common law rule, the court determined
that the defendant had the right to use as much force as was
64. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 501.
65. Id.
66. Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J.
1128, 1129-32 (1969).
67. Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1129-30. Some courts distinguished between
arrests which were patently unlawful and those having only technical or minor de-
fects, holding that the right to resist exists only in the former. Id. at 1131-32. See
also John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900) (reversing a murder convic-
tion for the murder of a policeman who attempted an illegal arrest). In Bad Elk, the
Supreme Court of the United States determined that the defendant had a "right to
use such force as was absolutely necessary" to resist an illegal arrest. Bad Elk, 177
U.S. at 537.
68. See Commonwealth v. Supertzi, 340 A.2d 574, 575 (1975). See supra note
48 for the text of § 505(b)(1)(i).
69. 167 A. 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
70. Doe, 167 A. at 242.
71. Id. at 241. The constable noticed a numbers book for an illegal lottery in
the back seat of a parked car that the constable previously had seen the defendant
drive. Id. When the defendant stated that he knew nothing about the numbers busi-
ness and entered the car, the constable took the key. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 241-42. The court decided that, although constables may arrest for
breach of peace without a warrant, the constable in this case had no right to detain
the defendant whom he had not seen committing a crime. Id.
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reasonably necessary to continue on his way.74 Concluding that
the pushing was justified, the superior court reversed the
defendant's conviction.7"
A statute prohibiting a person from obstructing an officer
serving or executing any legal process was enacted in
Pennsylvania as part of the Penal Code of 1939.6 This statute
was amended in 1943 to include a prohibition of obstructing an
officer making a legal but warrantless arrest.77 In 1963, the
crime of committing an aggravated assault and battery upon a
police officer was added to the Penal Code of 1939, but this
statute specified that the officer had to be making or attempting
a lawful arrest.7"
The lawful arrest element of the crime was referred to by the
dissent in Commonwealth v. Thompson.79 In Thompson, the
defendant had grabbed the wrist of a policeman who was
arresting him for loitering and disorderly conduct, and was
convicted of assault and battery on a police officer."0 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed without defining or
discussing any issues.8 ' However, the dissent considered the
74. Id.
75. Doe, 167 A. at 242.
76. See 1939 Pa. Laws 894, 894-95, § 314. The Penal Code of 1939 stated:
Section 314. Obstructing Officer in the Execution of Process.
Whoever knowingly, wilfully and forcibly obstructs, resists or opposes any
officer or other person duly authorized, in serving or attempting to serve or
execute any legal process or order, or assaults or beats any officer or person,
duly authorized, in serving or executing any such legal process or order or for
and because of having served or executed the same; or rescues another in
legal custody; or whoever being required by an officer, neglects or refuses to
assist him in the execution of his office in any criminal case, or in the preser-
vation of peace, or in apprehending and securing any person for a breach of
the peace, is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Id.
77. See 1943 Pa. Laws 306, § 314.
78. The following section was added:
Section 314.1. Committing an Aggravated Assault and Battery upon a Police
Officer.
Whoever commits an aggravated assault and battery upon a police officer
making or attempting to make a lawful arrest is guilty of a felony ....
1963 Pa. Laws 234, § 314.1. The original crime of "Obstructing Officer in the Execu-
tion of Process" was renamed "Obstructing an Officer in the Execution of Process or
in the Performance of His Duties." Id.
79. 274 A.2d 762 (Pa. 1971).
80. Thompson, 274 A.2d at 762-63. The policeman was reaching into
Thompson's car for the keys to prevent Thompson from leaving, and the policeman's
arm muscles were sprained. Id.
81. Id. at 762. The majority decision was simply written as "PER CURIAM:
Order affirmed." Id. Per curiam is defined as a "phrase used to distinguish an opin-
ion of the whole court from an opinion written by any one judge." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
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issue of the validity of the arrest and argued that the officer was
not justified in arresting the defendant for either loitering or
disorderly conduct.8 2 Though not referring to the statutory
definition of the crime, the dissent pointed out that reasonable
and apparently necessary force may be used to resist a forcible
unlawful arrest.8 3 The dissent concluded that the defendant's
use of force in resisting the unlawful arrest was not
unreasonable, and that the conviction for assault and battery on
a police officer should have been reversed."4
In Commonwealth v. Beam,85  the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania refused to let the constitutionality of the statute
upon which an arrest was based be an issue in the defendant's
conviction for resisting arrest and for assault and battery."5 The
defendant, Beam, had punched a police officer while being
placed under arrest for verbally abusing the officer. 7 The
defendant pled guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct at a
summary proceeding, and a jury found him guilty of resisting
arrest and assault and battery.8 An issue facing the superior
court was whether the convictions for resisting arrest and
assault and battery should be reversed because the disorderly
conduct statute was unconstitutionally vague.89 The superior
court decided that the only issue at the defendant's trial was
whether the officer could have had a reasonable belief that the
defendant was violating the statute.90 The court noted that
82. Thompson, 274 A.2d at 763 (Eagan, J., dissenting). The Commonwealth
had admitted that Thompson was not guilty of loitering, and the dissent did not
find that the defendant's abusive and foul language directed toward the officer dis-
turbed the community's peace and dignity. Id.
83. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Doe, 167 A. 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933)).
84. Id.
85. 324 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
86. Beam, 324 A.2d at 551-52. Although Beam was decided in 1974 after the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code was enacted, the Act of 1963 was still in effect because
the arrest occurred February 23, 1972. Id. at 550-51. The court applied Section 314:
Whoever knowingly, wilfully and forcibly obstructs, resists or opposes any offi-
cer . . . in making a lawful arrest without warrant . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor
Id. at 551 n.2 (quoting 1963 Pa. Laws 234, § 314).
87. Id. at 550. Beam shouted at and threatened the officer for ticketing two
taxi cabs owned by Beam's company. Id.
88. Id. at 550-51.
89. Id. at 551. A "statute is 'vague' if its prohibitions are not clearly de-
fined . . . or if it does not provide explicit standards for its enforcement." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1549 (6th ed. 1990). Beam also contended that the Commonwealth
subjected him to double jeopardy by not bringing all charges in one proceeding, as
required by Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), which held that all
charges arising from the same episode be brought in the same proceeding. Beam,
324 A.2d at 551. This argument was also unsuccessful because the court refused to
apply Campana retroactively. Id. at 553-54.
90. Beam, 324 A.2d at 551.
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statutes are presumed valid until a court decides otherwise and
that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be challenged by
resisting arrest."'
In its discussion, the Beam court also referred to an erosion of
the right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest.92 The court
stated that, since this concept was first presented in Bad Elk, 3
procedures have been developed to vindicate and to protect the
constitutional rights of those whose arrests are later determined
to be unlawful.94 Additionally, the court referred to the
abolition of the right in the Uniform Arrest Act and the Model
Penal Code (the "MPC"), and in five states. 5 The superior court
concluded that the jury was properly instructed on the issue of
the officer's reasonable belief, and affirmed the convictions for
resisting arrest and assault and battery."
In 1972, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code (the "Crimes Code")
was enacted." The Crimes Code establishes a comprehensive
set of criminal laws that is stricter and more effective than
previous laws.98 Section 505 of the Crimes Code justifies the
use of force in self-protection,99 but in a departure from the
91. Id.
92. Id. at 551 n.3.
93. See supra note 67 for a discussion of Bad Elk.
94. Beam, 324 A.2d at 551 n..
95. Id. Section 3.04 of the Model Penal Code provides:
(2) Limitations on Justifying Necessity of Use of Force.
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Section:
(i) to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a
peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (1985). Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act pro-
vides:
If a person has reasonable ground to believe that he is being arrested by a
police officer, it is his duty to refrain from using force or any weapon in re-
sisting arrest regardless of whether or not there is a legal basis for the arrest.
UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 5, quoted in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L.
REV. 315, 345 (1942). The five states referred to are California, Delaware, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Beam, 324 A.2d at 551 n.3.
96. Beam, 324 A.2d at 552, 554.
97. 1972 Pa. Laws 1482 (codified as amended at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101-
9183 (1990 & Supp. 1995)).
98. See Sheldon S. Toll, Pennsylvania's New Crimes Code-The
Commonwealth's First New Criminal Code in More Than a Century, 44 PA. B. ASSN
Q. 294 (1973).
99. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(a) (1990). Section 505 states:
Use of force in self-protection
(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.
The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion.
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common law, explicitly excludes force used to resist an arrest,
even if the arrest is unlawful.' 0 Section 505 was modeled after
section 3.04 of the MPC, which was adopted at the 1962 Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute.'0 ' The drafters of the
MPC noted that recourse for illegal arrest should be provided by
remedies other than the use of force, and that the allowance of
force would probably cause even greater injury to the person
being unjustly arrested.' 2
Another section of the Crimes Code derived from the MPC is
section 5104, which defines the crime of resisting arrest. 3 The
comments of the drafters of the MPC indicate that section 5104
was not meant to include mere non-submission or minor scuffling.'
100. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i). See supra note 48 for the text of §
505(b)(1)(i). The section applies only if the individual or suspect knows that the per-
son effecting the arrest is a peace officer. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i).
101. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 Official Comment-1972 (Supp. 1995). The
pertinent part of Section 3.04 reads as follows:
Section 3.04. Use of Force in Self-Protection.
(1) Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the Person,
Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against
the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.
(2) Limitations on Justifying Necessity for Use of Force.
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Section:
(i) to resist an arrest that the actor knows is being made by a peace
officer, although the arrest is unlawful.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1)-(2)(a)(i) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
Section 505 omits the phrase: "Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Sec-
tion 3.09," but is otherwise identical. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(a)-(b)(1)(i).
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) commentary at 19 (Tentative Draft No.
8, 1958).
103. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104 Official Comment-1972 (Supp. 1995). The
Model Penal Code defines the crime as follows:
Section 242.2. Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement.
A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of preventing a public
servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the per-
son creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone
else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome
the resistance.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). Section
5104 is identical except for the substitution of the words "with the intent" in place
of "for the purpose," and also for specifying a misdemeanor of the second degree. See
supra note 33 for the text of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104.
104. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.31 commentary at 129 (Tentative Draft No. 8,
1958). The drafters stated:
[W]e wish to confine the offense [of resisting arrest] to forcible resistance that
involves some substantial danger to the person. The policy against making
mere non-submission an offense ... extends to minor scuffling not unusual in
arrest.
Id. Section 208.31 was later renumbered as 242.2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.2 com-
mentary at 214 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Recent Decisions
In 1972, the crime of aggravated assault and battery upon a
police officer from the Act of 19631"5 was revised and made
part of section 2702 of the Crimes Code ("section 2702").o6 At
this point in time, however, the crime still referred to injury of a
police officer making or attempting to make a lawful arrest.' 7
Section 505 was referred to in dictum' in Commonwealth v.
Supertzi,'" in which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
that one may not forcibly aid another in resisting an unlawful
arrest."' The defendant, Supertzi, had attempted to pull police
officers away from another man whom they were apprehending
in an arrest that was subsequently determined to be
unlawful."' After the Commonwealth presented its case
against Supertzi for resisting arrest, obstructing justice, assault
and battery, and inciting a riot, Supertzi's demurrer to the
evidence' was sustained and the Commonwealth
appealed. "'
In deciding the issue of whether Supertzi was justified in
helping the man who was resisting the unlawful arrest, the
superior court implied that section 505, which was not in effect
when Supertzi was apprehended, abrogated the right to resist
an unlawful arrest in Pennsylvania."' The court also discussed
the trend away from the common law right to resist an unlawful
arrest, the difficult technicalities involved in determining
whether probable cause exists, and the availability of civil
105. See supra note 78 for the text of the 1963 Act.
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2702 Official Comment-1972 (Supp. 1994).
Section 2702. Aggravated assault.
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury
to a police officer making or attempting to make a lawful arrest;
1972 Pa. Laws 1525, § 2702(a)(3).
107. 1972 Pa. Laws at 1525, § 2702(a)(3).
108. Dictum is defined as "an observation or remark made by a judge in pro-
nouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of
law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily
involved in the case or essential to its determination." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454
(6th ed. 1990).
109. 340 A.2d 574, 575 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
110. Supertzi, 340 A.2d at 576. See supra note 76 for the text of 1939 Pa.
Laws 872, § 314, which was the law applicable when the offense was committed. See
Supertzi, 340 A.2d at 574 n.l.
111. Supertzi, 340 A.2d at 575-76.
112. Id. at 574. Demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception
by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out
his case or sustain the issue." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 433 (6th ed. 1990).
113. Supertzi, 340 A.2d at 574.
114. Id. at 575.
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remedies for false arrest.11 Because a person coming to the aid
of another in forcibly resisting arrest is even less able to
determine the validity of the arrest, the superior court concluded
that there is no right to aid in the resistance.116
In 1976, in Commonwealth v. Bartman,"7 the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that a lawful arrest is an element of
the crime of aggravated assault on a police officer."1 In
Bartman, after an initial investigation in response to a
neighbor's complaint about youths playing ball, nine officers
became involved in a scuffle while trying to arrest the
youths.' Two of the youths, the defendants in Bartman, were
found guilty of aggravated assault on a police officer and
recklessly endangering another.2 '
The issue before the superior court concerning the charge of
aggravated assault was whether the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that the use of force is not justified under
section 2702(a)(3) even if the arrest is unlawful."' The
superior court distinguished Bartman from Commonwealth v.
Stortecky,"' in which it held that the trial court may make the
determination that an arrest is lawful rather than submitting
the issue to the jury when considering a charge of aggravated
assault.12' The court explained that in Stortecky, there was no
dispute that the legality of the arrest was an element of the
crime of aggravated assault on a police officer.' The court
noted that section 2702(a)(3) is inconsistent with section
505(b)(1)(i), because the latter makes the use of force in resisting
an unlawful arrest unjustifiable."' Nonetheless, the superior
court concluded that the language of section 2702(a)(3) makes a
legal arrest an element of the crime of aggravated assault and
that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that the
arrest was legal."6
115. Id.
116. Id. at 576.
117. 367 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
118. Bartman, 367 A.2d at 1124.
119. Id. at 1123. A man called the police after a scuffle occurred between him
and some youths he claimed had been using abusive language while playing volley-
ball in a neighboring lot. Id.
120. Id. The youths were acquitted on charges of disorderly conduct and simple
assault. Id.
121. Id. at 1124. Another issue concerned the charge of recklessly endangering
another person. Id. at 1125.
122. 352 A.2d 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
123. Bartman, 367 A.2d at 1124. See Stortecky, 352 A.2d at 492.
124. Bartman, 367 A.2d at 1124 n.5.




In Commonwealth v. Whitner,"7  the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania ruled that, in an assault on a police officer in the
process of making an arrest, a lawful arrest is not an element of
the crime of simple assault and section 505 precludes the
defense that the arrest was unlawful."8 A police officer had
stopped the defendant, Whitner, for suspicious conduct and was
in the process of searching him when Whitner hit the officer
with a suitcase, the contents of which subsequently proved to be
stolen."9 After Whitner was convicted of burglary, robbery,
and conspiracy, the lower court granted a motion for a new trial,
suppressing the evidence as being the fruit of an illegal search,
and the Commonwealth appealed. 30
The superior court considered the issue of whether the officer
had sufficient cause to arrest Whitner and to search the
suitcase. 3' The court determined that, regardless of the
legality of the original stop, Whitner committed the crime of
simple assault when he struck the officer with the suitcase. 3'
Moreover, the court held that Whitner could not use the
justification of self-defense due to the limitation in section
505(b)(1)(i). ' The superior court held that the officer had
probable cause to arrest Whitner for assault and was justified in
searching the suitcase." The court concluded that the search
was legal and reversed the motion for a new trial without
deciding the legality of the original stop.'35
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania clarified section 5104,
which proscribes resisting arrest, in Commonwealth v. Karl."'
127. 361 A.2d 414 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
128. Whitner, 361 A.2d at 418 n.13. The crime of simple assault is defined as
follows:
Section 2701 Simple assault.
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701(a) (1990).
129. Whitner, 361 A.2d at 416.
130. Id. at 415.
131. Id. at 416.
132. Id. at 417-18.
133. Id. at 418. See supra note 48 for the limitation in § 505(bXl)(i).
134. Whitner, 361 A.2d at 418. When the officer seized the suitcase, coins fell
from it. Id. The court noted that the coins, "coupled with the facts already within
[the officer's] knowledge" justified the search, but it did not specify the relevant
facts. Id.
135. Id.
136. 476 A.2d 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
1996
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:755
The defendant, Karl, was convicted of resisting arrest even
though the Commonwealth agreed on the illegality of the
underlying arrest.
13 7
The issue on appeal was whether, as a matter of law, the
defendant could not be convicted of resisting arrest because the
underlying arrest was illegal. 3 ' The superior court explained
that the first part of section 5104, which proscribes resistance to
a lawful arrest, was inapplicable as a matter of law.'39 The
court also determined that the second part of the statute dealing
with the prevention of a public official from discharging any
other duty, did not apply." ' Referring to the comments of the
MPC, after which section 5104 was modeled, the court
determined that this provision of the statute referred to duties
other than arrest."' Otherwise, the court noted, officers could
always argue that they were investigating the underlying
incident if the arrest proved to be unlawful.14 Thus, the court
concluded that a defendant who resists an illegal arrest cannot
be convicted under section 5104."
In a 1986 amendment, the lawful arrest language was
removed from section 2702(a)(3), which proscribes aggravated
assault.1" The amendment required, instead, that the injury
be to a police officer or firefighter in the performance of a duty."
137. Karl, 476 A.2d at 909. After a man whose car was hit identified Karl as
the driver of the other car, the police attempted to arrest Karl for hit and run. Id.
at 910. Karl refused to put his feet in the police cruiser, wouldn't allow the police to
handcuff him, and threw his weight in such a way that the officers were pushed to
the pavement. Id. Although the arrest was unlawful because the officers did not see
the offense being committed, the trial court sent the case to the jury, which found
Karl guilty of resisting arrest. Id. at 909-10.
138. Id. at 909.
139. Id. at 911.
140. Id.
141. Id. Examples of these duties include "a policeman executing a search war-
rant, a fireman putting out a blaze, a forest or agricultural official making required
inspections, an election official charged with monitoring balloting, and the like."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.2 comment 5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
142. Karl, 476 A.2d at 911.
143. Id.
144. 1986 Pa. Laws 1517, § 2702(a)(3). In the following amendment, the words
in brackets were deleted and the words in italics were added:
Section 2702. Aggravated assault.
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury
to a police officer [making or attempting to make a lawful arrest] or a
firefighter in the performance of duty;
Id.
145. Id. The change was introduced, without discussion, in the Pennsylvania
Senate in an amendment to House Bill 2474. H.R. 2472, 170th Leg. (1986). In rec-
Recent Decisions
In 1989, in Commonwealth v. Novak,146 the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania had the opportunity to address the amendment
to section 2702(a)(3) and held that a jury need not be given an
instruction on simple assault when a defendant is charged with
aggravated assault for injuring a police officer effecting an
arrest. 
17
Novak had pushed and punched a police officer who was
trying to arrest him for disorderly conduct.'" A jury found
Novak guilty of aggravated assault under section 2702(a)(3) and
of resisting arrest."' Novak appealed, presenting the superior
court with the issue of whether the trial court should have
granted a request for a jury instruction on the crime of simple
assault.50 Novak argued that, if the jury found the arrest to be
unlawful, the offense would have been simple assault rather
than aggravated assault.' 1 The superior court agreed that this
would have been true prior to the 1986 amendment, but that a
lawful arrest is no longer an element of the crime of aggravated
assault. 152
However, the superior court had to consider the statute before
it was amended because the trial court erred by using the
earlier statute in the charge to the jury.' 3 Because the legality
of an arrest is an issue of law for a court and the superior court
determined that the arrest was legal, the court concluded that
the instruction on simple assault was not required."5
ommending that the House concur in the Senate amendments to the bill, Represen-
tative Mayernik indicated that one amendment was to include firefighters in the
performance of their duties in the definition of aggravated assault. Id. However,
Representative Mayernik did not mention the removal of the language on lawful
arrest. Id.
A similar change was made in § 2702(a)(2), which proscribes causing serious
bodily injury to police officers, firefighters and other service employees. See 1986 Pa.
Laws 1517, § 2702(a)(2).
146. 564 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
147. Novak, 564 A2d at 990.
148. Id. at 989. Novak had thrown a wallet at the police officer, who was sit-
ting in a patrol car. Id. The officer chased and overtook Novak, who shouted obscen-
ities and threatened the officer. Id. Novak's pushing and punching caused various
injuries to the officer's neck, back and hands. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 990.
152. Novak, 564 A.2d at 990. The court explained that ff there is no disputed
evidence as to the elements of a greater offense, a court is not required to give a
jury charge on a lesser included offense. Id. at 989.
153. Id. at 990.
154. Id The court determined that because the officer heard Novak shouting
obscenities in public, and because Novak would not stop, the officer had probable
cause to arrest Novak for disturbing the peace. Id.
1996
Duquesne Law Review
The decision in Biagini is entirely consistent with the
current state of the law in Pennsylvania. Section 5104 of the
Crimes Code explicitly makes a lawful arrest an element of the
crime of resisting arrest."5 Moreover, it is easy to respond to
the dissent's argument that the other portion of the statute
referring to the prevention of a public servant from discharging
any other duty should have been adopted by the majority in
Biagini. As pointed out in Karl and reiterated in Barry W., the
drafters of the MPC did not intend for the section to apply to an
arrest situation.66 Otherwise, in every conviction for resisting
arrest when the underlying arrest was unlawful, the officers
could argue they were discharging their duties in investigating
the underlying incident."7
A lawful arrest has not been an element of section 2702(a)(3)
of the crime of aggravated assault since the 1986
amendment. 158  Because the facts indicated that Officers
Snyder and Ashby were injured in the performance of their
duties and as the result of the defendants' intentional
actions,159 the convictions for aggravated assault were valid.
An argument might be made that, once the illegal arrests were
attempted, the officers were no longer acting in the performance
of their duties. However, the legality of an arrest is often a
technical question which is difficult to determine in a volatile
situation."'0  Making an error with respect to this
determination does not mean the officers are no longer
performing their duties.
As to the last part of the decision in Biagini, the supreme
court was strictly following section 505(b)(1)(i) and the decision
in French in holding that there is no right to resist an unlawful
arrest and that force may be used only in response to the
unlawful use or threat of deadly force.'' Thus, there was a
155. See supra note 33 for the text of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104.
156. Karl, 476 A.2d at 911; Barry W., 621 A.2d at 673-74.
157. Karl, 476 A.2d at 911; Barry W., 621 A.2d at 673-74.
158. See supra note 144 for the text of 1986 Pa. Laws 1517, § 2702(a)(3). Be-
cause the words "attempting to make a lawful arrest" after "police officer" were re-
placed by "or a firefighter in the performance of duty" and based on the remarks
about the amendment on the floor of the House, one could argue that the intent
was merely to include firefighters, and that the phrase "in the performance of duty"
was added because it could apply to both firefighters and police officers. See supra
note 145 and accompanying text. However, the words "lawful arrest" are not synon-
ymnous with "performance of duty." A lawful arrest is no longer an element of the
crime.
159. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 498.
160. Commonwealth v. Moreira, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1983).
161. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 500. See also supra note 48 for the text of 18 PA.
CONS, STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i).
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proper basis for the entire holding in Biagini.
Moreover, Pennsylvania law is in accord with the modern
trend away from the common law right to resist an unlawful
arrest and toward the resolution of the issue in a court of law.
In 1983, in Commonwealth v. Moreira,6' the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts listed thirty states that abolished the
right to resist an illegal arrest not being effected by excessive
force."6 3 Besides the difficulty in determining whether there is
probable cause for the arrest, reasons cited by jurisdictions in
abolishing the right to resist include changes in society, the
benefits of liberal bail laws, the availability of public defenders,
the right to remain silent, and speedy trials.'6
However, remedies available to those subject to unlawful
arrest can be expensive and time consuming, require proof
which is sometimes unavailable, and do nothing to remove the
stigma of the arrest.6' Many commentators have pointed out
that discussions concerning remedies and the discouragement of
violence miss the point, or at the least, do not adequately
address the problem." A person faced with a truly unjust
arrest does not stop to consider the consequences.' 7 The
rationale of the common law right to resist arrest is that the
person is provoked into violence and acts on impulse. 6
Although this would not apply to some technically illegal
arrests, it has been suggested that victims of certain patently
illegal arrests be excused from involuntary illegal conduct into
which they were provoked. '69 One problem with this approach
is in deciding when the provocation is sufficient to excuse the
assault, especially considering the possibility of conflicting
testimony concerning the events leading to the arrest.70
162. 447 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1983).
163. Moreira, 447 N.E.2d at 1226. Eleven states accomplished this by judicial
decision, as Massachusetts was in the process of doing, and nineteen by legislative
enactment, as was done in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1227.
164. Id. at 1227.
165. See Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1134-35.
166. See id. at 1133-38. See also James C. Engel, Note, The Right to Resist an
Unlawful Arrest in Modern Society, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107 (1984); James
Moskal, Comment, Justification, Excuse, and Resisting Unlawful Arrest, 33 WAYNE L.
REV. 1471, 1474-75, 1490-95 (1987).
167. See Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1136; Engel, supra note 166, at 108;
Moskal, supra note 166, at 1492.
168. See Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1136-37; Engel, supra note 166, at 108;
Moskal, supra note 166, at 1492.
169. See Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1136. See also Engel, supra note 166, at
112-13; Moskal, supra note 166, at 1495.




In Massachusetts, if the arresting officer uses excessive force,
all of the circumstances, including human frailty, are considered
in deciding if the arrestee's use of force in resistance is
reasonable.'71 It has been suggested that all charges stemming
from an illegal arrest be adjudicated using a similar test.'72
Circumstances to be considered include the amount of
provocation, the officer's use of force, the reason for the arrest,
and whether the arrest was technically or patently illegal.'73
This test might satisfy those who believe provocation should
excuse forcible resistance to unlawful arrest,7 4 as well as those
who want to limit the justification of violent behavior. However,
although this approach may have been possible in
Massachusetts when it abolished the right to resist arrest by
judicial decision,' it is not an option in Pennsylvania under
the current Crimes Code.
Nonetheless, Pennsylvania apparently takes a middle-ground
approach. The consequence of the decision in Biagini is that no
crime is committed by a person in refusing to submit to an
unlawful arrest unless that person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly causes bodily injury, attempts to cause such injury, or
negligently causes injury with a deadly weapon.7 ' Actions
such as becoming limp or minor scuffling do not constitute the
crimes of aggravated assault or simple assault, and, if the arrest
is unlawful, would also not result in a conviction for resisting
arrest.
The common law rule permitting resistance to an unlawful
arrest may have been partly intended to discourage a potentially
malicious or ambitious police officer from trying to entrap an
individual into committing a crime by purposely effecting an
arrest.'77 It has even been suggested that the Biagini ruling
may encourage police abuse in Pennsylvania because it denies
the arrestee the right of self-protection from an attack by a
171. Moreira, 447 N.E.2d at 1228.
172. See Engel, supra note 166, at 113.
173. Id.
174. This is not an uncommon belief. Provocation is still considered in other
areas of criminal law to at least lessen the severity of the crime. See Moskal, supra
note 166, at 1492. See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503 (1990) (A killing may be
involuntary manslaughter rather than murder if it is done in the heat of passion
and under provocation.).
175. Moreira, 447 N.E.2d at 1226.
176. See supra notes 128 and 34 for the text of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 and
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(3). See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(2) (aggravat-
ed assault is also committed if one intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
serious bodily injury to a police officer).
177. See Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1146.
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police officer unless the officer uses force capable of causing
serious bodily injury or death.'78 However, using force to resist
arrest only escalates the amount of force used, and could result
in even greater injury to the arrestee as well as to the officer
involved.
A different solution to the problems associated with patently
illegal arrests might involve changes in or clarifications to police
procedure so that fewer illegal arrests occur. Although there is
still the possibility that a particularly unscrupulous police officer
may act in violation of proper policies and procedures, remedies
other than a return to the common law rule may be possible.
One attempt to solve this problem has been through some
type of administrative review,179 but other possibilities have
been suggested. For example, in the 1950's, the California Bar
Association Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure
suggested a type of civil action or summary proceeding where
the person subject to unlawful police action would receive a
monetary judgment to be paid by the political subdivision
employing the officers involved.18
The last consideration is whether the modern approach to
resisting arrest is unconstitutional. Arguments have been
advanced that statutes limiting the right to reasonably resist an
unlawful arrest present due process and First Amendment
problems.' However, until the United States Supreme Court
rules on the issue, it is unlikely that any current laws will be
overturned on that basis.
In summary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Biagini was
simply following the law. Moreover, that law takes a middle-
ground approach by not allowing a conviction for the crime of
resisting arrest when the arrest proves to be illegal, while
allowing conviction for aggravated assault. Although there might
be potential for abuse, remedies other than a return to the
common law right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest merit
study.
Alexandra W. Tauson
178. See Mary Ellen Fox, Supreme Court Clarifies Resisting-Arrest Standards,
18 PA. L. WKLY. 196 (February 6, 1995) (quoting an attorney who represented Barry
W. on appeal).
179. But see Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1135 (Even in cities that have long-es-
tablished complaint policies, administrative remedies tend to be futile.).
180. 29 J. ST. B. CAL. 263, 264 (1954), cited with approval in James B.
Lindsey, Comment, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest: Judicial and Legislative
Overreaction?, 10 AKRON L. REV. 171, 183 (1976).
181. See Chevigny, supra note 66, at 1138-39.
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